THE WESTERN FRONT
THE FOURTEEN POINTS: JANUARY 1918
It was on the 18th January, 1918, that the American President, Woodrow Wilson, outlined his fourteen points to Congress. It was a fairly detailed plan, drawn up to provide what he saw as the framework for lasting world peace. Based on the concept of “moral diplomacy”, he hoped that once the war was over, “peace without victory” could be achieved by the acceptance of these fourteen points. As we have seen, when war broke out in 1914 Wilson had been in favour of the United States remaining neutral, and in 1916 he was re-elected on that platform. When war did come, however – inevitably brought on by Germany’s unrestricted submarine warfare and the possibility of a war with Mexico – he put his mind to the future in the hope that such a cataclysm could never occur again. As we shall see, five points dealt with general principles; eight were concerned with specific territorial problems highlighted by the conflict; and the 14th, the most significant point, advocated the establishment of an international organisation to ensure world peace: the League of Nations.
Acknowledgements
Wilson: georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov Fourteen Points: tes.com Free Trade: globaltimes Freedom of Seas: en.wikipedia.org Balkans: tiktok.com Alsace-Lorraine: linelast.com Ottoman Empire: store.steampowered.com Disarmament: imdb.com Self-Determination: sites.psul.edu No Secret Talks: fortune.com Poland: en.wikipedia.com Belgium: nzhistory.govt.nz Serbia: en.wikipedia.org League of Nations: historythings.com Austria & Italy: en.wikipedia.org Stairway: commons.wikimedia.com Promise and Reality: lib.luc.edu Baby Show: en.wikipedia.com
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Among the Allied nations, as one would expect, lip sevice was paid to the basic principles of the Fourteen Points, but praise went no further. There was little or no real support for this “moral diplomacy” wherein all the belligerents laid down their arms, and the victors – given the promise of an ever-lasting world peace – agreed not to seek retribution by dint of their victory. France and Great Britain rejected the idea out of hand. If they won the war, then Germany was to pay and in full measure – the so-called War Guilt Clause – for the terrible conflict they had unleashed in Europe and across many other parts of the world. The French, in particular, sought revenge for its six million dead or wounded; the devastation of vast areas of land along its northern border, and the virtual collapse of its whole economy. The British, though less directly affected, also sought justice for the heavy losses incurred, and the immense cost of a war which, for them, spread way beyond the Western Front. And other Allied nations, such as Italy and Romania, had entered the war on the understanding that they would gain coveted pieces of enemy territory once victory had been achieved. Indeed, come the peace settlement, the American Congress itself, plus the majority of the American public, came out against belonging to a group of nations which could well involve them in another European War on the other side of the Atlantic. Such could well be the cost of this so-called “peace programme”.
Meanwhile, Germany took the same line. The u-boat campaign was proving successful, and extra forces were now available for a series of decisive campaigns on the Western Front, including, indeed, a direct attack on Paris itself. Victory should be achieved well before American forces were sufficiently strong enough to alter the balance of power. However, as we shall see, when these high hopes began to fade, it was upon Wilson’s Fourteen points that the Germans accepted the terms of an armistice. If these alone had been the basis of a settlement, then this would clearly have taken the sting out of their defeat, but the War Guilt Clause was yet to come!
At best, Wilson’s blue print for a post war peace settlement, aimed at making the world safe for democracy, can be seen as a praiseworthy initiative. It was, indeed, an alternative to the traditional international balance of power, which, preserved by a series of alliances, was a frequent cause of division rather than unity amongst the nations of the world. Whether it was a practical alternative, however, was quite another matter. If not, then the concept could well be seen as a sadly idealistic one. Indeed, it can be argued that Wilson saw his vision of a contented and peaceful world against a blank screen, a “tabula rasa”, upon which a new beginning could be boldly inscribed. But the slate upon which the long and troubled history of mankind was written could not be wiped clean overnight, if wiped clean at all. Herein lay the gap between promise and reality (see cartoons above). For Wilson, this was a hope too far.
Incidentally, having studied the Fourteen Points, the French prime minister, Georges Clemenceau, quipped that Wilson had needed 14 points to put the world to rights, whereas the Good Lord had done it in ten!
But despite the failure of Wilson’s peace plan, when events turned against the Germans in the summer of 1918, it did play an important role in enticing them to agree to an armistice based on his Fourteen Points. And the creation of the League of Nations in January 1920 was a small but significant step towards a better understanding between the countries of the world, large or small. In the meantime, however, the German army, confident of success on the Western Front, made an all-out bid for victory. In March the Ludendorff Offensive was launched, a series of attacks aimed at driving a wedge between the British and French forces and then putting both to flight. As we shall see, this “Spring Offensive” actually proved to be a do-or-die bid for victory, …….. Germany’s final gamble.
