THE WESTERN FRONT

THE SECOND BATTLE OF VERDUN:  AUGUST 1917

    As we have seen in the Battle of Verdun 1916, General Erich van Falkenhayn’s plan, approved by the Kaiser, was initially successful. The idea of introducing a campaign of attrition by which France could be “bled white” appeared to be a feasible proposal, given that, psychologically, the ancient city of Verdun was an historical treasure, a symbol of national defiance to the French people, an enclave to be defended to the last man. This being so, a ruthless, relentless blood letting – mainly by heavy artillery – would knock France out of the war, and make the British talk peace.

     In the first three months of their campaign, beginning in February, the Germans captured ground to the north of Verdun and, more to the point, inflicted huge loses on the French. By May they had taken two of the largest forts, Douaumont and Vaux, and were within two miles of Verdun itself. The French, however, as expected, put up a determined, spirited fight, and the new French commander, General Pétain, quickly rushed troops and munitions into the region. Then in June tables were somewhat reversed. As planned, the allies launched attacks on two other fronts, the Battle of the Somme and, in Russia, the Brusilov Offensive, and Falkenhayn was obliged to take a reduction in his men and material. He did launch a further attack in his war of attrition, but it made no serious headway. Then, come October, the French felt strong enough to go on the offensive and, within a matter of weeks had retaken both Fort Douaumont and Fort Vaux. The Germans called a halt to their offensive; the threat to Verdun had been met and repulsed; and the French remained a viable force of arms, prepared to fight another day.

     Thatxday came in August 1917 when the French re-opened the Verdun campaign, determined to drive the German army further out of their homeland. Following on, as it did, from the failure of the Nivelle Offensive in April, and the serious mutiny that that had aroused, there was some concern about the loyalty of the frontline forces, but this proved unfounded. In taking ground and capturing 100 guns and a large number of prisoners – put as high as 10,000 – they did suffer extremely heavy casualties. However, these losses were tolerated. Pétain’s sensitive handling of the mutiny itself, and the introduction of some improvements in the troops’ living conditions, had clearly played a part in helping to settle the unrest. More to the point, however, was the fact that the Nivelle Campaign had been an unmitigated disaster, whereas the French defence of Verdun, despite serious setbacks, had been an outstanding success. Falkenhayn’s plan had failed, and the French were now eager to go on the offensive.

Acknowledgements

Intro: linuxgameconsortium.com Map: guntenberg.org French Attack: by Italian artist Giuseppe Rava from the French Poilu 1914-18 by English writer Ian Sumner German Attack: by South African artist John Askew from Storm of Steel by Chris Collingwood.

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     The French plan of attack involved eight divisions over a six mile front either side of the River Meuse. In the air, 16 fighter aircraft were put on standby to defend reconnaissance aircraft and observation balloons. The opening bombardment was intense via 1,280 field guns and 1,600 heavy guns and howitzers, but the Germans had spent many months in strengthening their fortified positions. When the infantry advanced, including Moroccan troops, they were met with heavy machine gun fire and shells from 380 artillery batteries. This, together with the use of mustard gas, slowed the advance and resulted in heavy casualties. Nevertheless, an advance was made. After ferocious hand-to-hand fighting on the west bank, the French captured the strategic stronghold of Mort Homme and Côte (Hill) de l’Oie (see map above). In the 1916 campaign, these had been the scenes of violent conflict. On the east bank it took a supreme effort and many lives to capture the Côte de Talou and, further north, the towns of Regnéville and Samogneux. (see map above). Overlooking as they did the city of Verdun, these were important gains. In these actions the French took 11,000 prisoners, but the cost to themselves was 14,000, some 4,470 of whom were killed or missing. The French made two further attacks in September, but made no gains, and one in late November had to be abandoned because of atrocious weather conditions.

     As we shall see, the final chapter in the Battle of Verdun came in September 1918. There was clearly opportunity in the Spring and Summer of that year to launch an all-out attack upon the enemy-held territory further north of the city – an area of strategic value concerning the German lines of communication – but Pétain knew only too well that that area was very strongly defended. Having promised that he would not throw away the lives of his men on large scale, costly offensives, he was prepared to wait for the arrival of large numbers of American troops, backed up by Allied tanks and aircraft. In September, that time came, and the American Expeditionary Force, commanded by General John Pershing and over a million strong, proved eager to play its part.

    In the meantime, the Western Front was to witness one of its most important engagements, the Battle of Cambrai, fought towards the end of November. This contained the first-ever mass attack by tanks, conducted over a six mile front. An advance was made, and this lumbering new weapon, though still prone to breakdown and still developing its specific role, showed growing promise as to its potential. But the advance made was not exploited, and a German counter attack regained most of the ground captured.