The offensive appeared to be well-timed. The Isonzo sector was quiet following the Italians’ fifth failure to make an incursion, and the situation in the Balkans and on the Russian front seemed sufficiently stable to justify a major assault elsewhere. The Italians, of course, were well aware of the build up of enemy forces in the Trentino, and had warned their First Army to prepare for a likely attack, but the 18 divisions assigned to the offensive outnumbered the Italian forces by four-to-one, and the 2,000 guns provided a clear superiority in artillery. Furthermore, the commander of the First Army, General Roberto Brusati, preoccupied with preparing for a local attack of his own, did not take the warning too seriously. Thus, when, on May 15th – following a massive barrage by some 2,000 guns – the Austro-Hungarian Third and Eleventh armies, under the command of Archduke Eugen of Austria, launched a powerful attack along a 30 mile front, they made impressive substantial gains. Within three days they had overrun the Italian trenches at Soglio d’Aspio, and seized the key mountain peaks of Zugna Torta, Monte Maggio, and Cimi di Campulozzo. Then, by the end of May, having left behind most of the tough alpine terrain, they had taken Asiago (though not wthout some extremely fierce fighting), and advanced some miles across Italy’s northern plain towards Vicenza (see map right above). There were even fears that the Italians might have to withdraw to defend the city of Venice, just 42 miles distant.
It was at this stage, however, that Höltzendorf’s troops were forced to a halt, and lost all hope of reaching the Adriatic coast. Exhausted by their descent through treacherous mountain terrain and lacking support by the sheer ruggedness and length of their supply lines, they had no option but to stop their advance. And events further afield played a vital part. Russia’s renewed and promising attack in Galicia, the Brusilov Offensive, brought forward to assist the Italians, meant that Höltzendorf had no alternatve but to abandon his cherished scheme in order to send every man he could spare to stop the Russian advance. This was a bitterxblow to Austrian morale, and made the worse by the response of the Italian Chief of Staff, General Luigi Cadorna (famous for his numerous attacks along the Isonzo River). He swiftly redeployed 400,000 men to the battlefield, using an efficient rail service, and this allowed the Italians to counter-attack. On June 2nd, the Austro-Hungarians were defeated at Civo and, two days later, at two points south and west of Asiago. And by mid-June they had been virtually pushed back to the point where they had launched their attack at the beginning of May, though Italy did not regain territory north and south west of Asiago. Casualties were heavy on both sides, as one might expect. The Austro-Hungarians lost around 100,000 men, killed, wounded or taken prisoner, and, as a result, tried never again to launch a major offensive without some measure of German assistance. For their part, the Italians lost close to 140,000 men in the same manner, but the failure of the Asiago Offensive, threatening as it did a full scale invasion and the likely collapse of Italy itself, did serve to strengthen the public resolve to fight on ... at this point at least.
For the Austro-Hungarians it was quite another matter. The failure of the Asiago Offensive, together with their poor showing on the Eastern Front, had important repercussions. Following their inability to counter Russia’s Brusilov Offensive, August saw the creation of a joint military command between the two Empires in which the Germans had complete, overall control. And by way of reinforcement, September saw the establishment of a joint High Command, headed by the German Kaiser himself. Hence forward the Austro-Hungarians were to become progressively more dependent, politically and militarily, upon their powerful ally ...... an humiliation for them and an increased burden for Germany.
Incidentally, the Austro-Hungarians dubbed the Asiago Offensive, the “Strafexpedition”, (“The Punishment Expedition”), a reference to Italy’s treachery in declaring war on Austria-Hungary in May 1915, having been a member of the Triple Alliance – and thereby a close ally of Austria-Hungary – since May 1882! ……
…… Thexfighting in the high altitude Alpine sectors of the Italian front is often described as “The White War” on account of the abundance of snow and the extreme cold. In 1917 the New York World correspondent, E. Alexander Powell, wrote, “On no front, not on the sun-scorched plains of Mesopotamia, nor in the frozen Mazurian marshes, nor in the blood-soaked mud of Flanders, does the fighting man lead so arduous an existence as up here on the roof of the world.”
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ThexAustrian General Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf (1852-1925) joined the army at the age of 19 and served in the Balkans for a number of years. He gained a reputation for his teaching at the War School i
n Vienna, and was Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff when the war broke out. In combat, however, he tended to under estimate the strength of his opponent and over rate the capability of his own forces. His invasion of Serbia in August 1914 ended in a costly failure, and a large measure of his success, both in the Gorlice-Tarnow Offensive and in the Polish Salient, was due to German support. Initially, it must be said, his Trentino Campaign, though somewhat ambitious, was highly successful, and its eventual failure was due, in part at least, to his having to send troops to counter the Brusilov Offensive. He was dismissed as Chief of Staff in March 1917, then with the rank of Field Marshal, and commanded the South Tyrolean Army Group until his retirement in July 1918. He died in 1925, a controversial figure and, it was said, “a broken man”.
THE SIXTH BATTLE OF THE ISONZO or
THE BATTLE OF GORIZIA – AUGUST 1916
The understandable resurgence of Italian confidence following the country’s success in repelling the Trentino Offensive, was given an extra boost in August, when the Italians, again led by Cadorna, won a decisive victory on the Isonzo front. Indeed, this operation, the Sixth Battle in this war zone (and also known as the Battle of Gorizia), was by far the most successful of the eleven battles waged by the Italians in this sector. All the others (save for a limited advance in the eleventh), were repulsed with heavy loses, due to the harsh terrain, the determined resistance of the Austro-Hungarians, and the strength of their defences. The Sixth, in fact, succeeded in establishing a bridgehead across the river, capturing the strategic city of Gorizia on the 8th and, for a time, coming quite close to reaching the coveted port of Trieste (see map below). In preparation for this attack, Cadorna – making good use of railways – had wasted no time in moving troops from Trentino bac
k to the Isonzo. This gave him an advantage in numbers, because the Austro-Hungarian forces in that sector had been seriously reduced in guns as well as troops in order to counter the Russian Brusilov Offensive, then taking place on the Eastern Front.
Thextwo-day opening bombardment, launched on the 6th August and confined to the immediate area around Gorizia, was powerful and effective, enabling a landing on the east bank of the Isonzo. From there, the Italians faced growing opposition, but at the Battle of Doberdo, just south of Gorizia, they defeated the Austro-Hungarian forces in a ferocious hand-to-hand battle (one of the bloodiest battles of the war) and opened the road to Gorizia, occupying the city (by then badly damaged) on the 8th August. In the meantime, Italian infantry conquered the two commanding heights of Monte Sabotino and Monte San Michele, and their enemy – mostly made up of Hungarian and Slovenian regiments – took up new positions east of Gorizia. The Italian offensive then entered its final stage, an attempt – and by no means the first one – to capture Trieste, … a prize indeed. By the 12th August the western sector of the Carso (the Karst Plateau) was in Italian hands, but the advance down the coast proved too great an undertaking. The retreating Austro-Hungarian forces had mustered a large force along this route, and north-west of Duino the Italians were stopped in their tracks and savagely repulsed. This was something of a set-back for Cadorna, given the progress the Italians had made in this offensive, but, with Gorizia in his hands; a bridgehead finally established across the Isonzo; and the Austro-Hungarian armies pushed some distance to the east; (and mindful perhaps, at last, of the heavy casualties already suffered!), he called a halt to the offensive on the 17th August.
The Italians lost 51,000 men, killed, wounded or taken prisoner, compared with 42,000 suffered by the Austro-Hungarians, but the Sixth Battle of Isonzo was a clear victory for the Italian armed forces, repairing somewhat their disappointing efforts in the past, and greatly boosting Italian morale. They had taken on a European power, unassisted, and won! However, formidable Austro-Hungarian defences remained to the north and east of Gorizia, situated along a series of heights which included Monte Santo, Monte San Gabriele and Monte San Daniele. These vantage points, and the artillery and small arms that went with them, stopped any further advance by the Italians.
GeneralxLuigi Cadorna (1850-1928) joined the Italian army in 1868, and, rising st
eadly through the ranks, was appointed Chief of Staff in July 1914. When the war broke out he set about the task of building up his army, and when, in May 1915, Italy declared war on Austria-Hungary – its former ally – he had 25 infantry and 4 cavalry divisions at his disposal. Despite a serious shortage of artillery and machine guns, he wasted no time in using the bulk of this force to reach the Isonzo River. From there, over the next two years, he launched a series of massed frontal attacks, eleven in all, in an attempt to establish a bridgehead on the other side and put his enemy to flight. But the quality of the Austrian defences and the difficult nature of the terrain, made this highly improbable. As we have seen, all attacks failed save the sixth (following on from his successful repulse of the Trentino Offensive). This failed to reach Trieste – a somewhat ambitious aim – but it captured and held on to the city of Gorizia in August 1916. This was a significant accomplishment, but these attacks, as noted earlier, launched with no regard whatsoever for the losses incurred, and brutally enforced, came at an enormous cost. In the first two weeks alone, the Italian army had lost 60,000 men, and by the end of the winter this number had increased to 300,000. With morale low and desertions ever increasing, the end of this slaughter came in October 1917, when a combined Austro-German force mounted a counter attack (the twelfth and final battle of the Isonzo), and won a decisive victory at the Battle of Caporetto. Cadorna, strongly criticised for his poor performance, was sacked. He served for a time on the military council at Versailles and, despite his somewhat tarnished record, was promoted to field marshal in 1924.
The Italians’ five remaining Battles of Isonzo, save, as we shall see, for the eleventh, made no headway, and, indeed, the twelfth and final battle, this time initiated by Austria-Hungary with the support of German troops, brought a crippling defeat for the Italians at the Battle of Caporetto in October 1917. Cadorna was dismissed, and all seemed lost, but the Italians were destined to live and fight another day.
As we have seen, it was in May 1915 that Italy declared war against Austro-
