It was while German troops were fighting their way through Belgium, that Russia’s 1st and 2nd armies (a total of 29 infantry divisions), launched a powerful attack upon East Prussia in support of France, and opened up the fighting on the Eastern Front. The Russian plan was for the 1st Army to take Konigsburg in the north, while the 2nd Army skirted the Masurian Lakes and trapped the Germans near the town of Allenstein (see map). This intention – Russia’s Plan 19 – had been suspected for some time, but, according to the predictions of the Schlieffen Plan it came some five weeks earlier than anticipated! It had been confidently assumed that, over so vast a country, it would take a month or more for Russia to mobilize its forces and be ready to launch a major offensive. By that time, France would have been defeated, and a large number of troops would have been available on the Eastern Front to face and defeat a second-
That proved to be a serious miscalculation. Facedxwith this sudden and unexpected onslaught, the German 8th Army defending the area was overwhelmed at the Battles of Stalluponen and Gumbinnen (20th July), and were obliged to pull back. Alarm bells sounded in Berlin. Indeed,xthe commander of Eastern Prussia, General Maximilian von Prittwitz, went so far as to suggest a full withdrawal to the west of the River Vistula. That was not acceptable. He was immediately replaced by Paul von Hindenburg (assisted by General Erich Ludendorff), and he quickly gave approval to a bold plan put forward by a member of his staff, LieutenantxColonel Max Hoffman. Having learnt from uncoded wireless messages that the commander of the Russian 1st army, General Paul von Rennenkampf, planned a few days of refit before launching an attack on Konigsberg, a small but conspicuous force – mostly cavalry – was left to face Russia’s 1st Army (a calculated risk), and the entire German 8th Army was moved to the south, some by train, to take on Russia’s 2nd Army (see red arrows on map above). Completely unaware of this manoeuvre, the Russian 2nd Army marched straight into the German trap. Atxthe Battle of Tannenberg that followed (Allenstein on the map), one of the largest encounters to take place on the Eastern Front (26-
Incidentally, inxorder to take Russian attention away from East Prussia, where they were planning this second battle of the Masurian Lakes, the Germans launched a diversionary attack upon Warsaw at the end of January 1915. This resulted in the Battle of Bolimov. It was inconclusive in its result, but it proved significant for being the first time that poisoned gas was used in the war. In fact, however, this new weapon, delivered via 18,000 shells, went virtually unnoticed. Because of the cold weather, the chemical froze and proved ineffective! ……
THE EASTERN FRONT
THE BATTLE OF TANNENBERG: 26th-
THE BATTLES OF THE MASURIAN LAKES: SEPTEMBER 1914 and JANUARY 1915
Acknowledgements
Map, Battle of Tannenberg: themaparchive.com Battle of Tannenberg: common.wikimedia.org Battle of Masurian Lakes: historica.fandom.com Map (Galicia): eeroots.blogspot.com. Eastern Front: robinsonlibrary.com/history Battle of Limanowa: avalanche press.com Przomysl: ww1live. wordpress .com Polish Salient: a contemporary New York Times map.
WW1-
To go back to the Dateline, click HERE
…… thexBattle of Tannenberg was actually fought at Allenstein a few miles distant (see map above), but was called Tannenberg by the Germans for propaganda reasons. It was at Tannenberg, back in 1410, that the German-
…… Over the years, questions have been asked as to why the Russian 1st Army did not go to the rescue of 2nd Army when the Germans launched their attack. The official answer is that the terrain between the two armies, the marsh lands of the Masurian Lakes, made such an attempt impractable. However, it is said by some that the two generals involved, Rennenkampf and Samsonov, were bitter rivals (as they were), and that Samsonov’s pleas for help went unheeded. That has never been confirmed. At the battle, the Russians lost some 120,000 men (including 9,000 taken prisoner), together with most of the equipment of an entire army.
Theyxdid well at first, gaining victories at the Battles of Krasnik and Komarov (see map left above), but they lost many men by mounting frontal attacks of infantry and cavalry, and when they were attacked on their flanks by two Russian armies they could advance no further. Atxthe end of August they were soundly defeated at the Battle of the Gnila Lipa with heavy losses. Then on the 3rdx September they lost the Battle of Rava-administrative centre of Lemberg) and were forced to retreat behind the Vistula and San Rivers. Byxthe end of the month they had fallen back to within fifty miles of Crakow, and had been forced to abandon their fortress city of Przemysl, then under siege. Under the command of Nikolai Ivanov and Aleksey Brusilov, virtually the whole of Galicia was now in Russian hands. Such was the measure of their success that a large number of German forces had to be transferred from the Western Front – created into the German Ninth Army – in order to hold the line. Had the Russians had more manpower and equipment at this stage, it is possible that they could have struck through the passes of the Carpathian Mountains, reached the Hungarian plain, and knocked the Habsburg Empire out of the war. Indeed,xit was only with the aid of a German infantry division, plus the onset of severe winter conditions, that the Russians were prevented from entering Hungary at the Battle of Limanowa, fiercely fought from 1st to the 13th December (illustrated), during what came to be known as the Carpathian Winter War. As it was, the Austro-
Atxthe best of times, the Austro-
Incidentally, thexsiege of the fortress city of Przemysl in the south-
THE BATTLE OF THE POLISH SALIENT: AUGUST – NOVEMBER 1914
With the Russians occupying most of Galicia, there was now a real fear that they would capture Cracow, gain entrance to Silesia, and advance on Vienna. In order to relieve the pressure on the Austro-
Incidentally, after the war many Russians felt that the contribution made by their forces in these battles on the Eastern Front had not been sufficiently recognised by the French. They argued that it played a large part in securing the failure of the Schlieffen Plan to capture Paris. This is impossible to determine, of course, but it is worth noting that just before the war General Helmuth von Moltke, Chief of the German General Staff, moved 180,000 men from the West to the Eastern Front, and that on the 28th August, during the attack on Belgium itself, two corps (about 60,000 men) plus a cavalry division were sent to support German forces on the eve of the Battle of Tannenberg. Some historians argue that this seriously weakened the plan’s crucial right wing, the thrust specifically planned to capture the French capital. ……
...... Itxwas soon after the battle for Galicia, in November 1914, that there was a brief encounter between ships of the Russian and Ottoman navies. On the 17th, a Russian force of five pre-
Apart from their campaign in East Prussia, where they certainly suffered a major defeat, it could be said that the Russians had fared fairly well in 1914. They had made a successful take-
AUGUST – SEPTEMBER 1914
While this action was taking place in East Prussia the Austro-