THE MIDDLE EAST FRONT

THE SUEZ-SINAI CAMPAIGN,

THE INVASION OF SINAI, MAY 1916, AND

THE FIRST AND SECOND BATTLES OF GAZA:  MARCH/APRIL 1917

Acknowledgements

Map Sinai: CNN.com General Murray: en.wikipeida.org. artist unknown. Map Campaign: nzhistory.govt.nz Reinforcements: pinterest.com British Prisoners: iwm.org.uk Kressenstein: encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net Revolt: Avalanche Press Arab Raid (detail): britannica.com. film Lawrence of Arabia, directed David Lean, Columbia Pictures

    As we have seen, the Ottomans launched three attacks upon the Suez Canal, aiming to block this vital waterway or, at best, to bring about an Arab revolt which would actually put an end to the British occupation of Egypt. However, the Sanussi Revolt, staged in neighbouring Italian Libya, failed in its attempt to incite an Arab rebellion, and the two military attacks upon the waterway in January and August of 1916 lacked the strength required to overcome the canal’s defences. By then both sides had come to see the need to strengthen the defence of the Sinai Peninsula. On thexBritish side, this idea was taken a step further by the commander of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force (EEF), General Archibald Murray (pictured). Based on a report by Major General Sir Henry Horne, he argued early on that the canal could best be safeguarded by building a defensive line further east so that the canal was beyond the range of the enemy’s heaviest guns. Furthermore, a railway and water pipeline should be constructed along the coast to support such an operation, and to assist in the eventual takeover of the Sinai peninsula. The strategy was adopted (see map below). Work on this engineering feat was begun in April 1916 (before the second attack on the Suez Canal), and the British prepared for an all-out offensive across the Sinai desert. Meanwhile, and in contrast, the Ottoman efforts to improve their defence of the area were to prove too little and too late.

    In Mayx1916 the British went on the offensive. The Egyptian Expeditionary Force, made up of six infantry and two mounted divisions, invaded the Sinai Desert, assisted by the railway and water pipeline (black dotted line on map). The Ottoman force (the Fourth Army), under-strength, short of armaments, and plagued by desertion, proved unable to hold back the assault. By a series of large-scale cavalry raids, mainly by Empire troops, the entire Sinai Peninsula was in British hands by the beginning of 1917. The only battle of any size, as we have seen, was fought at the oasis town of Romani in the August (see map), when an Ottoman force, some 16,000 strong, attempted to stop work on the advancing railhead. The attack was swiftly repulsed. There then followed the taking of El Arish in December and a daring but highly successful raid upon the the Ottoman garrison at El Magdhaba by the Anzac Mounted Division and the Imperial Camel Corps Brigade. After this the Turks fell back on Rafa, their last stronghold in Sinai, but this was captured early in January 1917, despite strong opposition, and the E.E.F crossedxinto Palestine.

THExPALESTINE CAMPAIGN – THE BATTLES OF GAZA

     Alarmed at this development, the Turks rushed reinforcements to Gaza to defend the Palestinian border, and quickly formed two new field armies, the 7th and 8th, to stop the enemy advancing further north across the Gaza-Beersheba line (see map above). Murray launched his attack on the 26th March, 1917, the First Battle of Gaza. It was not a promising start. A thick sea fog hampered the advance in the morning; there was a deal of confusion between divisional and brigade commanders as to troop movements, and the Ottoman garrison (much larger than anticipated and well defended) put up a determined fight. It was not until early evening that the town had been surrounded, and, in the north, troops had captured Ali Muntar, a local advantage point. It was at this point, however, that news was received that a large Ottoman force, under German command, was approaching Gaza from the north and north-east. With the invasion force running short of food, water and ammunition, Murray sanctioned a general withdrawal, fearing that his army would be totally overwhelmed come the morning. British casualties amounted to 4,000, almost twice the numbered suffered by the Turks. Murray officially dubbed the operation a victory, but others saw it as a serious defeat. The War Office and the government reserved their judgement, being assured that the next attack would break through the Gaza-Beersheba Line and open the Palestinian Campaign. It didn’t.

     Indeed, in the Second Battle of Gaza, launched on the 17th April, 1917, the British forces – notably enlarged – fared even worse, failing to pierce through the Ottoman defences at any point and suffering some 6,400 casualties (killed or wounded) as a result. In this encounter – the first time gas and tanks were employed on the Middle East Front – the main cause of failure was the lack of accurate and sustained artillery fire. The British heavy guns and the French naval gunfire proved totally inadequate to destroy the Turks’ forward defences. In addition, the eight tanks employed made little if any impression, and the gas attack proved too weak for purpose. As a consequence, infantry or mounted attacks were countered and swiftly repulsed. Be it rightly or wrongly, Murray again decided to withdraw his troops. Unfortunately for him and the Allied cause in general, this was not the best of times to be associated with failure. This humiliating defeat coincided with the collapse of the Nivelle offensive on the Western Front; reports of mounting unrest among Russian troops (following the February Revolution); and a costly escalation in the war being waged by German U-boats. Murray was relieved of his command and replaced by General Edmund Allenby at the end of June. This was understandable, given such failure on the battlefield, but it could be said that his strategy concerning the defence of Sinai, and his capture of the peninsula itself, laid the foundation for the defeat and ultimate overthrow of the Ottoman Empire.

     Axman who played a leading part – indeed, a paramount part – in the warfare surrounding the Suez Canal and the Sinai Campaign was the German General Friedrich Kress von Kressenstein (1870-1948). As leader of the Ottoman Desert Command Force, he it was who organised the two raids upon the Suez Canal and then, having been driven out of the Sinai Peninsula, soundly defeated the British in the First and Second Battles of Gaza. In December 1917, however, he met his match in General Allenby. His forces were defeated at the Third Battle of Gaza, but he withdrew his troops in good order and took up defensive positions further north. He served the last five months of the war in Georgia, and retired from the army in 1929.

    In fairness to Murray, it can be argued that his defeat in the first two Battles of Gaza was due to the fact that – under political pressure to restore faith in the Allied cause – he had been pushed into attacking without having the required number of troops. It is certainly true that the Turks had substantially reinforced the Gaza-Beersheba Line, and, when his time came, be it noted, Allenby himself did not make a move until he had received more troops and armaments by late 1917. This said, Allenby was to bring more vigour to the campaign. His experience in the Boer War, where he commanded mounted units, had given him a good training in a war of movement. As we shall see, this quickly became evident in the Third Battle of Gaza. Launched towards the end of October, this victory opened the gateway to the Palestine campaign. In the meantime, however, as we shall see, the allied campaign was immeasurably assisted by the Arab Revolt that broke out in the Hejaz region of Arabia in June 1916. Advancing steadily northwards, these Arab rebels added strong support to the Allied cause, especially following their capture of the valuable port of Aquaba in July 1917.

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