THE ITALIAN FRONT

A-H ADVANCE ON THE ASIAGO PLATEAU: 15TH-16TH JUNE 1918

THE SECOND BATTLE OF THE PIAVE RIVER: 15th – 22nd JUNE 1918

     As we have seen, it was in August 1917 that the Italian Chief of Staff, General Luigi Cadorna, launched his final attack – his eleventh in fact – along the River Isonzo. With an army of no less than 50 divisions, supported by 5,200 guns, he succeeded in capturing a substantial area of the Bainsizza Plateau south of Tolmino (see map below). It was not until a month later that the Austro-Hungarian army, under severe pressure throughout, managed to hold the line and bring an end to the Italian advance.

Acknowledgements

Capretto Front: greatwar-1914.tumblir.com Isonzo Front: ww1live.wordpress.com Intro: youtube.com Map: Courtesy of Sam Eedle- tewkesburyhistory.org Crossing the Piave: twitter.com Crossing the Piave (Incidental): roadstothegreatwar-ww1.blogspot.com Grafitti: etinkerbell.wordpress.com A Farewell to Arms: wrbh.org

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     It was a triumph for Cadorna, but it came at a price. Such were the losses suffered by the Austro-Hungarians (something in the region of 115,000), and such was the doubt cast upon their ability to withstand another onslaught, that the Germans felt it necessary to commit troops to this demanding front. Just seven divisions proved sufficient to swing the balance! The result, as noted, was the Battle of Caporetto in October 1917, a total rout of the Italian forces. But, fortunately for them, by that stage, the Germans had run out of steam. They attempted to cross the River Piave – the First Battle of the River Piave – in November but, failed in the attempt, and Venice, together with Padua and Verona, remained in Italian hands!

     Their resounding defeat at the Battle of Caporetto almost knocked Italy out of the war. There was extreme public unrest throughout the country, and the army, severely reduced by desertion, was virtually a broken force. The situation was eventually saved by the intervention of the British and French. Together with the Americans, they had already sent a number of divisions to this turbulent battlefield. Now they reorganised the country’s armed forces and, just as importantly, provided economic assistance in the shape of coal and iron ore, and food crops imported from Argentina. In the meantime, Cadorna had been removed from his position following the debacle of Caporetto, and the new chief of the general staff, Armando Vittorio Diaz, had set about improving the morale of the troops by introducing better living conditions. In fact, Cadorna’s dismissal was one of the conditions set by the French and the British in return for their support in this crisis!

    Italy’s enemy was not so fortunate. No such help was at hand for the Austro-Hungarians. Their army was also in disarray, despite their recent victory; there was a serious shortage of food and munitions; and on the home front there was mounting opposition to the war amongst the numerous ethnic groups that made up a large bulk of the Empire. But the German High Command was preparing for its last-ditch offensive, Operation Friedensturm, and no troops or material could be spared. Indeed, on the 15th June, at the insistence of the Germans in effect, they felt obliged to mount another offensive, despite their overall weakness as a fighting force.

    Becausexthe Austrian commanders could not agree on an overall plan, it was decided to make a two pronged attack: an assault from the Asiago plateau (the Trento Offensive), and a further attack along the River Piave (see map) – a decision that greatly reduced the strength of both offensives and made them much less likely to succeed! In fact, however, given the circumstances, success was most unlikely in any form. On paper the Austro-Hungarians had an army of 53 infantry divisions, but the majority of these were down from 12,000 to 8,000 men, if not more; many of the new battalions were only at half strength; and it was estimated that near to 200,000 Hungarians troops had deserted from the beginning of the year. In addition, there was a serious shortage of food; a significant lack of war material; and the Italians, with the support of the French and British, had a clear advantage in both fire and air power.

     The attack across the Asiago Plateau, in the foothills of the Alps (see map above), was made over a wide front on the 15th and 16th June, and, initially made good progress towards Mount Grappa. Success in this sector would make the River Piave indefensible, and open the road to Venice, just 40 miles distant. But it was not to be. A French and British force (five divisions in total), slowed down the advance and then, with the arrival of Italian reinforcements, stopped the Austro-Hungarians in their tracks. And, by accurate bombing of their supply lines, that is where they stayed.

     Thexother prong of the offensive, – the Second Battle of the Piave River (see map above) – was to prove their last attack on the Italian Front. Under strength, and lacking in horses and basic equipment, 100,000 men managed to cross the river, despite intense bombardment and small arms fire, and establish a bridgehead some fifteen miles wide and five miles deep. It was a significant achievement, but in the long run they proved no match for a revitalized Italian Army, supported by a sizeable Allied ground force and the overall command of the skies. On the 2nd July, an Italian counterattack turned the Austro-Hungarian flank and drove the invaders back to the river. By this time, however, many of the make-shift bridges and boats had been destroyed, and vast numbers of troops were stranded and captured. Of those who attempted to swim across the river, swollen by heavy rain, only a few managed to reach the other side. By the end of August it had become clear that the Austro-Hungarian army, demoralized and crippled by heavy casualties and widespread desertion, was no longer capable of mounting another attack. Indeed, the growing political unrest at home raised the possibility of the army having to be totally withdrawn to quell domestic unrest. Casualties for the Austro-Hungarians (dead, wounded and captured) were understandably high, 118,000, compared with a total of just over 87,000 for the Allied forces.

    Incidentally, as one might expect, the River Piave – bearing in mind its role in halting and then forcing back the enemy – became symbolic of Italy’s recovery in the war and of its final victory. A song about its part in Italy’s history, composed in 1918, became Italy’s national anthem in 1943, aimed at instilling a sense of pride in the country, despite its eventual capitulation in the Second World War. ……

    …… After the battle, a piece of graffiti, written by an Italian infantryman, was discovered on the wall of a badly damaged house in the town of Fossalta di Piave. It read: “It is better to live one day as a lion than a hundred years as a sheep”. Later, this gallant sentiment was picked up and widely used by the fascist dictator Benito Mussolini (1925-1945), and, as a result, it is often attributed to him.

     ...... The famousxAmerican author Ernest Hemmingway served as an ambulance driver on the Italian Front, arriving there early in June 1918. His love story A Farewell to Arms, published in 1929, was told against the background of his wartime experience.

     As we shall see, it was in October 1918 that the final conflict on the Italian Front, the Battle of Vittorio Veneto (see map above) took place. Not surprisingly, it marked the end of the Austro-Hungarian army as such, and, in its wake, the final collapse of the Empire itself. Early in November, the Italians entered Trento and Trieste, and both powers reached a separate armistice. Fighting came to an end a full week before the conflict stopped on the Western Front.

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