THE WESTERN FRONT

THE NIVELLE OFFENSIVE:  APRIL – MAY 1917

THE SECOND BATTLE OF THE AISNE AND MUTINY IN THE FRENCH ARMY

THE BATTLE OF LA MALMAISON:  OCTOBER 1917

   As we have seen, the Second Battle of Arras was launched by the British early in April 1917 to support a much larger French assault further south, the Second Battle of the Aisne. Thexbrain child of Robert Nivelle, Commander-in-Chief of the French Army – and dubbed “The Nivelle Offensive” – it was a most ambitious venture, aimed at breaking the deadlock on the Western Front and making possible an all-out bid for victory. Nivelle (pictured) had come to prominence as a highly successful commander at the Battle of Verdun in October 1916. As you will recall, by a policy of dogged determination (motto: “They shall not pass!”), and the successful use of a creeping barrage, he had turned around French fortunes in that encounter. In that month he had recaptured the stronghold of Fort Douaumont – no small achievement in itself – and then, in early November, had seized back Fort Vaux, putting an end to any immediate threat to Verdun itself. It was on the strength of that outstanding performance that the following month he replaced Joseph Joffre as the Commander-in-Chief.

    Nivelle’s plan for April 1917 was a huge assault on a 30-mile front from Soissons to Reims – involving 1.2 million men – in order to break through the German line along the Chemin des Dames (Ladies’ Way). This, he claimed and promised, would be achieved in 48 hours. The French could then join up with the British forces in the north (if they had been likewise successful), and make a speedy, mass advance on Germany itself. It was the logic of the Battle of the Somme writ large! The French prime minister Aristide Briand favoured the idea, but the French war minister, Hubert Lyautey, was skeptical, and resigned when it was approved. The British General Douglas Haig had doubts about the plan, bearing in mind the futile and costly assaults of the past, but many in the Allied military supported it, seeing it as a likely means of breaking the deadlock imposed by trench warfare, now in its third year. Something needed to be done, and this could well be the answer.

    Unfortunately for the Allies, the plan was out of step with reality. When 1,650 guns began the opening barrage on the morning of 16th April, the Germans were ready and waiting. With the aid of reconnaissance missions – their aircraft were virtual masters of the skies at this juncture - they had gained a very accurate idea of what was to come and, more importantly, where it was to come. As a result Generals Paul von Hindenberg and Erich Ludendorff had introduced their “defence in depth”, establishing two or three lines of trenches, one behind the other, to prevent a sudden break-through, and with concrete-built pill boxes to protect the flanks. Beyond these fortifications was a natural barrier, the Chemin Des Dames Ridge, over 18 miles wide and located on the River Aisne. This had been in German hands since September 1914, and had been strengthened over the years by the building of well-constructed machine gun posts along its entire width. In addition, the Germans had improved communication in the battlefield by laying telephone lines beyond the target areas, and setting up stations to provide a link between aircraft and guns.

     Following the initial bombardment – insufficient as it proved to be – Nivelle again employed his creeping barrage. This time, however, it was not well coordinated, and at times left the infantry (33 divisions) and tanks (128) wide open to attack. Despite this, an advance of several miles was made on both flanks. In the centre, however, the need to cross the Aisne and then climb and capture the Chemin des Dames Ridge was a daunting and, as it turned out, impossible task. This was not ideal tank country and, in any case, very few of the 128 tanks employed were left intact. The infantry did make it to the top in one or two areas, but by the 20th April it was abundantly clear that the offensive had failed. There was to be no break through, and no swift advance on Germany, just plenty of time to contemplate the cost. Some 40,000 French troops were killed or wounded on the first day of the attack, and by the time the offensive ground to a halt on the 9th May, the total had risen to 187,000, including 29,000 killed. Strategically, it was a far cry from the promise made, and, casualty-wise, it was far in excess of the 10,000 envisaged. Not surprisingly, on the 15th May Nivelle was relieved of his command and replaced by General Philippe Pétain. He spent the rest of the war as Commander-in-Chief of the French Army in North Africa.

Acknowledgements

Nivelle Portait: kssww1.ku.edu Nivelle Offensive: historica.fandom.com/wiki Chemin des Dames: Trebes (Aude)1914-1918 The Germans: dw.com. Deutsche Welle, artist unknown The French: WW2-weapons.com/diary1917 artist unknown. Mutiny (Heading): WW2-weapons.com/diary1917 Mutiny: quora.com.artist unknown. Map (La Malmaison): commons.wikimedia.org Chemin des Dames (detail): posterazz.com painting by French artist Alfred Boisfleury.

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     Itxis perhaps not too surprising that the serious defeat of the Nivelle Offensive, after such high expectations, plus the enormous casualties suffered, brought mutiny in its wake. In a matter of days, some fifty divisions – more than half the number of French divisions on the Western Front – showed some measure of defiance, openly supporting a growing number of vociferous young men who had had enough of the appalling conditions they lived in, and were no longer willing to take part in the bloodbaths that went along with the constant battles of attrition. And such raw discontent was not confined to the lower ranks. A number of mid-ranking officers had openly refused to send their men back into battle, concerned at their fatigue and the stress they were under.

     But this was not mutiny in the full sense of the word. Some could well argue – and did – that it was the result of the Army’s mismanagement of the fighting soldier. None had refused to fight in defence of his homeland (unlike the debacle then happening in the Russian army), and this had been made very clear by the determination and the bravery they had shown from the beginning of the war. However, it was a refusal to carry the fight to the enemy and, taken to extremes, this could result in a German victory. Discipline had to be restored, and seen to be restored.

     Pétain acted with caution. Given the peace movement in Russia (which must have played some part in the mutiny itself), France was in real danger of revolution and defeat. That being the case, only the major ring-leaders were arrested and charged with mutiny, put at 554, and of that number only 49 were executed. At the same time – having suspended all French offensives – he visited all major units on the Western Front to assure his troops that their grievances would be met. Food would be improved, the wine ration would be increased, and leave from the front would be honoured. But above all, he promised that their lives would not be callously thrown away on large scale offensives which had little chance of success. All major attacks would now await the arrival of American forces. (The United States having entered the war on the 6th April.) These would provide the extra troops and equipment required for a purposeful and successful road to victory.

    Pétain’sxhandling of the situation proved sufficient to calm matters down. As a leader he was generally admired by the lower ranks, and this played a significant part in his success. At the Second Battle of Verdun in the August, despite a large number of casualties, the French troops stood their ground, as they also did in their contribution to the British offensive in Flanders. Then,Xcome October, the debacle of the Nivelle Offensive was finally laid to rest at the Battle of La Malmaison. The target was another attempt at capturing the Chemin Des Dames, but this time it was a small scale operation (just seven miles wide), limited in its objectives, but with overwhelming fire power, the launching of a poweful gas attack, and the improved use of tanks. The artillery, three times the German strength , provided a well-coordinated rolling barrage; the dense layer of gas virtually closed down the low-lying land along the Oise-Aisne Canal; and the 21 tanks that reached the battle zone (the “Artillerie Spéciale”), took out enemy machine gun posts and provided significant protection for the advancing infantry. Within four days the fortress town of La Malmaison had been taken, together with Allemant, Vaudesson and Pinon, and the coveted ridge of the Chemin Des Dames was in French hands. The Germans did launch a number of counter attacks, but they were out-gunned and forced to withdraw to north of the River Ailette. This operation was a far cry from the disastrous Nivelle Offensive, fought over the same ground six months earler, and it fully confirmed the recovery of the French army from the mutinies then spawned.

     Incidentally, on the 27th May 1918, during their Spring Offensive, the Germans regained the fortress of La Malmaison (or what was left of it), together with the famous ridge of the Chemin des Dames (pictured here). However, on the 28th September the French Chasseurs Alpins retook the fort and ridge, just a few weeks before the end of the war.

    But the Nivelle Offensive was a lesson that was not learnt. As we shall see, the next Allied onslaught (all British) began in July and lasted for three months. It could well have been called “The Haig Offensive”; was officially described as “The Third Battle of Ypres”; and came to be ever known by the general pubic as “Passchendaele”, the name of a small Flanders village over which a deal of the fighting was savagely fought. It is a name that, amid the blood, mud and slaughter of the Western Front, has come to epitomize the horrors and heartaches of the First World War.

MFA