As we have seen, the Allied spring offensive had ended in failure. In the Second Battle of Artois – remembered above all for the numbers of men, killed or wounded – the British had failed to take Aubers Ridge, as planned, and the French had failed to take Vimy Ridge, as planned. However, both French commanders, Joffre and Foch, remained convinced that victory would have been achieved had they had heavier artillery, and the reserve forces had been located closer to the front line. Their next attempt was to show only too clearly that, this being the case, they had not, in fact, acted on the lessons they had learnt.
ThexThird Battle of Artois was, in fact, a three-pronged pincer movement encompassing a French and British attack in the Artois region, and a powerful French assault further south in Champagne. Master minded by the French commander Marshall Jospeh Joffre, it was seen as a window of opportunity. The German armies on the Western Front had been weakened by the sending of troops to strengthen the Eastern Front, and an assault of such width and strength would give moral support to Allied campaigns elsewhere, especially the Italians – just starting their battle against Austro-Hungarian forces along the River Isonzo – and the Russians, then struggling to hold back the Gorlice-Tarnow Offensive. Unfortunately for the Allies, it was to prove the largest and most costly of their campaigns to-date and, like earlier attacks, was to fail in the attempt.
Joffre’s immediate aim was to reduce the Noyon Salient, a bulge of German-held territory that, at its full extent, was little more than 67 miles north-east of Paris. The taking of Vimy Ridge and the town of Loos in Artois (see map below), plus the capture of the vital railway line in the Champagne-Ardenne region, would force the Germans to abandon the salient. In this eventuality – a likely one in Joffre’s opinion – then a cavalry division and seven in reserve were available to put the Germans to flight over the open country beyond .... as far, perhaps, as the Belgian border!
The French attack on Vimy Ridge, a stretch of high ground, as we have seen, that dominated the region around Arras, was launched on the 25th September by 19 divisions of the 10th Army. Led by General Ferdinand Foch, the preliminary bombardment, both fearsome and sustained, was mounted along a line some twenty miles wide, running between La Bassée and Arras (see map). The major assault, however, was again directed at Vimy, a military advantage point that stood in the way of any meaningful advance. Foch was confident that after four days of heavy and continual shelling (made up of 630 field guns and 420 heavy artillery pieces), followed by a massive and prolonged infantry attack – supported by reserves where necessary – Vimy would be taken, the Noyon Salient would be unsustainable, and a large cavalry force would regain freedom of movement and the success that went with it. 
Initially some progress was made. Within three days the area around the village of Souchez, at the western base of the ridge, had been captured, as was one of the high points on the ridge itself, but this measure of success triggered off a massive German counter-attack (see map on right). By the 11th October the French had been forced back to their own lines, having sustained some 50,000 casualties. Failure was mainly due to the French forces inability to break through Germany’s second line of defence. The opening bombardment had failed to destroy much of the barbed wire entanglements on the first line (seriously reducing the numerical advantage) and, immense and sustained though it was, it had lacked the power and depth to destroy the second line of defences some three miles ahead. At that point, as was their practice, the Germans had provided deep, well constructed trenches and dugouts, enabling the vast majority of the German infantry to survive the bombing and, come the attack, confront the enemy in force. And between the two lines, the Germans had established concealed machine-gun posts and gun emplacements to attack and slow down the advancing enemy. The French fought tenaciously, but the odds were pitted against them.
To thexnorth, the British attack on Loos, something of a diversionary measure but with promise of a break through, fared no better. Following a four-day bombardment, poison gas was used for the first time – released from 5,000 cylinders – and for several hours this opened a gap in the German front line, some four miles wide. This enabled the British (six divisions strong) to advance and quickly meet their objective to seize Loos, but they failed to capitalize on their success. When they resumed their attack the following day, crossing over ground which offered little cover, the Germans had regrouped and, via a line of well-placed machine guns, mowed down the advancing infantry. A German counter-attack then followed, and by early October the British had been pushed back to their starting line. Total British casualties amounted to over 60,000 (including 35,000 Scottish troops), compared with some 26,000 suffered by the Germans. It proved a large scale depletion of “Kitchener’s Army”, the first hundred thousand young men who had volunteered at the outbreak of war. At one stage Foch sent a sizeable force of infantry to assist the British, but it made no difference to the outcome. After the battle, the British Army commander, Sir John French, was accused of holding back reserves that Sir Douglas Haig (leading the attack) had badly needed during a critical stage in the fighting. He chose to resign, and was replaced by Haig himself.
Despite the British defeat, the Battle of Loos proved a steep learning curve for the Royal Flying Corps in what was its biggest encounter to date. It was fast becoming an integral part of the expeditionary force. In its reconnaissance role in particular – an ever increasing asset on the battlefield – serious thought was now given to the taking of photographs and the need for better air-to-land communication. Means were introduced to improve the quality and the interpretation of aerial prints, and work was begun on providing transmission from pilot to ground command, though it was to take some time in the coming. And thought was also being given to the importance of air dominance and the use of aircraft in a tactical role.
FieldxMarshal Sir John French (1852-1925) joined the Army as a cavalry officer in 1874. He served with distinction in the Sudan and South Africa, and when the First World War broke out was made supreme commander of the British Expeditionary Force in France. He held this post until late 1915, but he clashed with Kitchener (then Secretary of State for War) over the location of the B.E.F; often had strained relationships with his French counterparts; and, due in part to a lack of decisive leadership, his offensives failed to gain their objectives, and proved very costly in casualties. As we have seen, at the Battle of Loos he ran foul of Haig, and was replaced by him in the December. He spent the rest of the war as Commander of Home Forces.
In thexSecond Battle of Champagne, where a force of 35 French divisions was more than twice the size of the German opposition, Joffre remained convinced that this was the area where the Germans were most likely to give ground. The campaign, France’s greatest offensive to-date, got off to a good start on the 25th September. Following three days of bombardment from 2,000 artillery pieces, the French 2nd army, attacking a weak sector of the German lines, opened a six-mile wide gap and advanced three miles. However, in a matter of hours, the Germans had rushed in reinforcements to plug the breach, and new barricades were being erected. When the French resumed their attack, they were unable to break through this second line of defence, and were forced to pull back. By mid October, with casualties close to 60,000, Joffre was obliged to call off the offensive. The railway line in the area which served German forces to the north – a valuable and assigned target – proved out of reach, and the Noyon Salient was in no way threatened. Once again, the lack of powerful and accurate artillery fire, before and on the battlefield, was seen as the major cause of defeat.
In the campaign as a whole – the three fronts – it is estimated that the French and British suffered an approximate total of 108,000 casualties, and the Germans, fighting from defended positions, lost less than half that number. On the 22nd October Joffre claimed that the autumn offensive had produced some important tactical gains, inflicted heavy casualties on the Germans, and had achieved “a moral superiority” over the enemy. He held that only the lack of artillery had prevented the campaign from achieving its strategic objectives. The Frenchxgeneral Émile Fayolle, known for his commands at Verdun and the Somme, considered that failure was due to uncut barbed wire and the firepower of German machine-gun and artillery. Erich von Falkenhayn, the German Chief of Staff, was more succinct. Quantity was not enough, he said, to defeat an army sheltering in fixed defences. These comments were the very stuff from which trench warfare was made!
Incidentally, itxwas during these three battles on the Western Front that the British nurse, Edith Cavell, was executed by the Germans on a charge of “war treason”. She was born in 1865 and became a nurse in 1896. After working in a number of English hospitals, she was appointed matron of a nurse training school in Brussels in 1907, and chose to stay on despite the German invasion of Belgium in 1914. In her work she gained a reputation for her devoted care of the war wounded, regardless of their nationality, but in 1915 she was accused, with others, of assisting some 200 Allied soldiers to escape to neutral Holland. She confessed to her part in this undercover operation, and was executed by a firing squad on the 12th October. This action, regarded by many as barbaric, and seen against a background of German atrocities throughout Belgium, aroused a great deal of anti-German feeling, particularly in the United States. Cavell herself, a devout Christian, recognised the severity of the case against her, and accepted the decision of the court marshal. In 1919 her body was brought back to England and, following a service in Westminster Abbey, was buried in the grounds of Norwich Cathedral, near to her home town of Swardeston. In March1920 an imposing memorial to her – the work of the British sculptor Sir George Frampton – was unveiled in St. Martin's Place, near to Trafalgar Square. It bore upon it her own words: Patriotism is not enough. I must have no hatred or bitterness towards anyone. ……
…… The British commanders, Field Marshal John French and General Sir Douglas Haig were opposed to Jofre’s three pronged attack when it was first outlined. They considered that there was not sufficient ammunition and forces in reserve, and that there was a serious lack of heavy artillery (as, indeed, it proved to be). The British Secretary State for War, however, Lord Herbert Kitchener over-ruled their objections. It was important, he said, that Britain should support the French, and, even more importantly, that Britain should be seen to support the French, “no matter what the cost”.
But, as we shall see, the losses sustained so far on the Western Front were 
to be seen as modest in comparison with the first and subsequent battles fought at Verdun-sur-Meuse. The German commander-in-chief, Erich von Falkenhayn, planned an assault against this important fortress town, commencing in February, 1916. The official aim of this campaign was to gain land by a series of short, sharp attacks, but this was little more than military window dressing. He well knew that this huge defensive bastion, constructed after the disastrous Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71, was a statement of faith in the survival and the security of the French Republic. It would be defended to the last Frenchman, and that is exactly what he hoped to achieve. He intended to let the French army bleed itself to death. It was to be a battle of attrition with few parallels.
BRITAINxINTRODUCES COMPULSORY MILITARY SERVICE – JANUARY 1916
It was clear by the end of the Third Battle of Artois that, following on from earlier engagements – notably Marne, Ypres and Gallipoli – the British army could no longer depend upon voluntary enlistment. At the beginning of the war, Kitchener’s famous recruitment campaign had encouraged over one million to enlist by early January 1915, and, for a time, the “Pals Battalions” had helped to keep up the flow. However, by the end of the year – with the “death, misery and deadlock” of the Western Front fully in the public domain – recruitment had slowed to a trickle. Action needed to be taken if Britain were to continue to play its part on the continent and further abroad. With casualties standing at over half a million, in January 1916 the British government was reluctantly obliged to introduce compulsory military service for men aged 18 to 41. It was not a popular move. In April 1916, for example, 200,000 people demonstrated against the act in Trafalgar Square, London, but it was here to stay. Indeed, in May 1916 the Act was extended to married men, and, later, the age was raised to 51.
Incidentally, some men were excused service because of the importance of their civilian employment, and quite a large body of men – put at 20,000 – were “conscientious objectors”, the majority refusing to fight for religious reasons. Menxwho, for some reason or another, were not in the fighting services were often the target of the White Feather Brigade, a group of women who gave out the feather as a symbol of cowardice and shame. The idea was inspired by the adventure story “The Four Feathers”, the work of the English writer and politician A.E.W. Mason, pubished in 1902.
FieldxMarshal Herbert Kitchener, lst Earl of Kitchener (1850-1916), Irish born, joined the Royal Artilley in 1871. He saw extensive service in Britain’s colonial possessions and, as a commander, is particularly remembered for his victory at the Battle of Omderman, his role in the Fashoda Incident, and his successful though controversial conclusion of the Second Boer War in 1902. He was appointed Secrtary of State for War in 1914, and in that office came in for some criticism, especially his handling of the Gallipoli Campaign. However, for his outstanding contribution to the raising of army recruitment (the “Kitchener armies”), he became the symbol (“the face” as it were) of the nation’s resistance and determination to win. There was an outburst of public sympathy in June 1916, when it was reported that he had been lost at sea while travelling to Russia on a political and military mission. His ship, HMS Hampshire hit a mine off the Orkney Islands. Of those aboard, only twelve survived.
Kitchener’s decision to call for the introduction of compulsory military service was not a popular move, but there was really no alternative. Indeed, the casualties suffered on the Western Front to-date were to be seen as insignificant compared with those that were to be suffered over the next three years. As we shall see, the battles fought over the French stronghold of Verdun were to give ample evidence of the scale of losses yet to be faced, and especially on the Somme and at Passchendaele.
