THE WAR AT SEA  

THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND:  31st MAY – 1st JUNE  1916

Acknowledgements

Location Map: eyewitnesstohistory.co Map of Battle: battlesofww1.weebly.com Battle Scene: artuk.org by English artist Robert Henry Smith Sinking of Indefatigable: britishbattles.com by German artist Willy Stower Losses: twitter.com Bulldog: loc.gov Tribune Graphic Scheer: en.numista.com Jellicoe: bbc.co.uk Beatty: fineartamerica.con February 1917: youtubel.com

    The Battle of Jutland was by far the most significant naval battle of the First World War. As we have seen, there were earlier conflicts at sea – such as the Battles of Coronel and the Falkland Islands off the coast of South America, and, in home waters, the Battles of Heligoland and Dogger Bank – but it was only at Jutland that the dreadnought battleships of both sides actually came face to face. Involving 250 ships and around 100,000 men, it was the largest, bloodiest and most controversial naval battle of its time .. and beyond!

     In essence, it was a German attempt to ease if not eradicate the British trade blockade of material and food which was slowly but surely crippling the German Empire. The plan was to lure out the British Battlecruiser Squadron (stationed at Rosyth under the command of Admiral Sir David Beatty), put it out of action, and then take on and defeat the larger part of the British Grand Fleet (commanded by Admiral Sir John Jellico), when – summoned to assist – it arrived from its distant base in the Orkney Islands (see map below). It was a highly ambitious scheme as it stood, but it was made the more perilous by the fact that, unknown to the Germans, the British had been warned by their codebreakers that the operation was in the offing, thereby ensuring that, when the trap was about to be sprung, Jellico’s force would already be well on its way to the battle zone. Combined, the two British forces would number 151 ships compared with the 99 available to the Germans. This said, the German High Seas Fleet was no mean force, comprising 24 battleships, 5 battle cruisers, 11 light cruisers and 63 destroyers.

    It was early on the 31st May that the German fleet, under the command of Admiral Reinhard Scheer (a man anxious to take on the enemy) entered the North Sea and, as planned, enticed the British Battle Cruiser Force to leave their base at Rosyth and confront the bulk of the German fleet, waiting some 75 miles off the west coast of Jutland (Skaggerak in German). The result was a one-hour long-range gunnery duel in which the Germans came off best, despite the fact that the Royal Navy had four of the world’s most powerful dreadnoughts. They lost their pre-dreadnought battleship SMS Pommern, and several of their ships were damaged, a number quite badly (including SMS Lutzow and SMS Seydlitz), but, in response, ships under the command of Admiral Franz Hipper sank two British battlecruisers – HMS Indefatigable and HMS Queen Mary (blown up by direct hits on their ammunition magazines), together with two destroyers, HMS Nomad and HMS Nestor. In the late afternoon, however, Admiral Beaty, springing his own trap, turned away to the north and brought the Germans into the direct path of Jellico’s larger portion of the Grand Fleet (28 battleships, nine battle cruisers, 34 light cruisers and 80 destroyers), arriving in good time from the Orkney Islands. Sheer now faced the entire weight of the British Grand Fleet, the very situation that he had planned to avoid. In the melee that followed, Jellico’s ships inflicted serious damage on the German fleet, but another British battle cruiser was sunk (HMS Invincible), Beaty’s flagship, HMS Lion, was badly damaged, and three armoured cruisers – HMS Defence, Warrior and Black Prince – trapped between the two battle lines – were put out of action. But despite this measure of success, Scheer, was only too aware that his fleet was seriously outgunned, and that he had no alternative but to make for home. Assisted by a thick mist, he made a last desperate attack – his so-called “death ride” – upon the British fleet, including the use of torpedoes, before making for the safety of Wilhemshaven. At the same time, Jellico, fearing the danger of further torpedo attacks in the failing light, decided not to go in pursuit, and turned for base. The battle, confusing and officially “inconclusive”, was virtually over, though sporadic fighting continued throughout the early hours, during which SMS Frauenlob was attacked and sunk by HMS Southampton, and the British lost their destroyer, HMS Turbulent.

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     The German navy lost eleven ships, including a battleship and a battle cruiser, and a number of its ships were badly damaged. Casualties amounted to some 2,500. The British sustained heavier loses, fourteen ships in total, including three battle cruisers, and with casualties put at 6,110. On paper, it was a German victory, and it was seen as such by press and public. In Germany, there was much rejoicing, and the Kaiser boasted that “the spell of Trafalgar is broken”. In Britain, of course, there was bitter disappointment at the poor showing of the most powerful navy in the world. But, from a strategic point of view, whilst the Royal Navy lost more ships and more men, it retained its dominance in the North Sea, and was able to continue the blockade, a major contribution to Germany’s eventual defeat. On June 2nd the Grand Fleet was ready for action, but the German High Seas Fleet spent many months repairing its damaged vessels, and never again challenged British control of the North Sea. As one New York newspaper put it, the German fleet had assaulted its jailer, but it was still in jail. And the New York Tribune Graphic (11th June, 1916) had no doubt about the victor (see pic below). Indeed, on the 4th July 1916, Admiral Sheer himself informed the German High Command that, because of Britain’s “great material superiority”, further fleet action was not an option. As he saw it, unrestricted submarine warfare was the best and only hope of achieving victory at sea.

    Nevertheless, as was to be expected, the leadership of both Jellicoe and Beaty was questioned. Winston Churchill, former Chief of the Admiralty, bluntly declared that Jellicoe was the only man on either side who could lose the war in an afternoon! Others openly accused him of being too cautious and lacking in initiative. Beaty, on the other hand, was taken to task for his vanity and “glory seeking”. But others argued that both men knew exactly what was required and, by a show of strength which put their ships at greater risk, drove the German High Seas Fleet back to dry land and kept it there for the rest of the war. And there was criticism, too, – some well founded – about the hardware itself. In the midst of the battle, Beaty himself had declared “there seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today”. In the case of HMS Indefatigable and Queen Mary, both violently blown up, it was suggested flash protection of the magazines was inadequate; the way ammunition was handled was seen as a contributory factor in the loss of three battle cruisers; a number of the leading ships appeared to be insufficiently armoured; and the lack of reliable communications – a major criticism following the Battle of Heligoland in August 1914 – continued to raise problems concerning the essential need for overall command.

    AdmiralxReinhard Scheer (1863-1928) joined the German navy in 1879 and progressed through the ranks, commanding cruisers and battleships. With the coming of the First World War, he was promoted to Admiral in 1916 and given command of the High Seas Fleet. Anxious to take on the British Grand Fleet – in two parts! – he distinguished himself in the Battle of Jutland, but saw unrestricted submarine warfare as the only means of countering the British blockade. He was promoted chief of the naval staff in August 1918, but retired at the end of the war.

    ...... AdmiralxSir John Jellicoe (1859-1935) entered the navy as a cadet in 1872 and saw active service in the Egyptian War of 1882 and the Chinese Boxer Rebellion that followed. He was appointed commander of the fleet on the day war broke out, and in 1916 came under heavy criticism for failing to achieve a convincing victory at the Battle of Jutland. In the Spring of 1917, as first sea lord, he strongly opposed the use of the convoy system to deal with the U-boat menace and, as a result, was abruptly dismissed at the end of 1917. In 1920 he was appointed governor general of New Zealand and, on his retirement, was made an earl.

    ...... Admiral Sir David Beatty (1871-1936) joined the navy in 1884 and from 1896 to 1900 served in Egypt, the Sudan and the Boxer Rebellion in China. In 1911, as a rear admiral, he served as secretary to Winston Churchill, the first lord of the Admiralty, and in 1913 took command of the navy’s battle cruiser squadron. Soon after the outbreak of the war, he played a distinguished role in both the Battle of Heligoland Bight and the Battle of Dogger Bank. In the Battle of Jutland, however, he was less successful, and his performance came in for some criticism. He served as first sea lord from 1919 to 1927, and was created an earl on taking up this appointment.

    The Battle of Jutland confirmed the important role to be played by the U-boat. Indeed, as early as February 1915, following the Battle of Dogger Bank, the Germans had moved towards a policy of unrestricted submarine warfare, seeing this as the means – the only practical means – of imposing a successful blockade upon Britain. The Kaiser had declared the waters around the British Isles a “war zone”, and this inevitably posed a danger to neutral shipping or passenger liners which, one might assume, were outside the scope of the blockade. Inevitably, this unrestricted submarine campaign resulted in the sinking of an ever increasing number of neutral vessels. As we have seen, the sinking of the passenger liner RMS Lusitania and the loss of 128 American lives in May 1915, did bring an end to this campaign, but it proved a temporary reprieve. The Germans resorted to indiscriminate attacks in 1916, despite their Sussex Pledge” of May the 4th, and in February 1917, with U-boats close to sinking an average of 13 ships a day, unrestricted submarine warfare was officially reintroduced. Swiftly and increasingly imposed, this was seen as the means – and probably the only means – to victory. But it was to come at a cost.