In general, the opening years of the war had not gone well for the Russian Empire. Apart from a measure of success in September and October 1914, when Russian forces had occupied Galicia and repelled a German attack on the Polish Salient, they had been soundly defeated at the Battles of Tannenburg and the Masurian Lakes in those same months. And by the end of 1915, the Central Powers, via the Gorlice-Tarnow Offensive, had pushed back the Russians (the so-called “Great Retreat”), regaining Galicia, capturing the Polish Salient, and invading Lithuania. Then in March 1916, following the Chantilly Agreement of December 1915 (whereby the Allies agreed to launch simultaneous attacks against the Central Powers when needed), Russia launched an attack upon Vilnius, south of Riga, and, at the Battle of Lake Naroch, suffered another costly defeat.
These failures clearly increased the political unrest stirring within Russia. That was here to stay and increase, but in the army itself, defection was as yet fairly limited, mainly because, over the long winter months, munitions were considerably increased – notably in the supply of guns, shells and, above all, an adequate supply of rifles – and the troops themselves received a longer period of training and a slight improvement in their living conditions. It was against this background, that in June 1916 General Alexei Brusilov planned and launched an attack upon Galicia in the general vicinity of the towns of Lviv, Kovel and Lutsk. The offensive was not supported by his fellow generals, but he was confident of success. The official aim was to relieve pressure on the French at Verdun and the Italians along the Isonzo River by forcing the Germans and Austro-Hungarians to transfer troops to Galicia. However, there was the hope that this attack might well knock Austro-Hungary out of the war altogether. As a result, quite a considerable force was assigned to the campaign. The four armies (Brussiloff’s Group) (see map), were made up of 140 infantry divisions and 40 cavalry divisions. They faced 105 divisions and 22 cavalry divisions, but it was more than likely that German troops would be called in to give support.
Brusilov was not an outstanding tactician, but he was an experienced and innovative commander and, above all, he believed fervently in the element of surprise and the need for careful preparation. This greatly contributed to his success. To provide additional cover for his infantry, he used reserve forces to dig a series of deep trenches along the front line, and in some places secretly organised the building of tunnels whereby special units could reach within a hundred yards (sometimes even less) of the Austrian forward trenches. And to conceal the time and place of any operation, he sent out false information by radio or runner. In the attack itself, the preliminary bombardment, assisted by air reconnaissance, was highly accurate and, by keeping it unusually brief, resulted in the opening attack taking the enemy completely by surprise. He favoured a surprise assault along a 300 mile front in order to maximize the use of his forces. This was opposed by the Stavka (the Russian high command), but he eventually got his way. But his plea that his offensive be supported alongside by neighbouring fronts to the north was denied, and that was to prove a crucial decision. When they were eventually called into action, it proved too late, and their resort to mass infantry attacks greatly added to the list of casualties.
Launched on the 4th June, 1916, the Brusilov Offensive (sometimes known as the “June Advance”), lasted until late September. Following an unusually brief but highly accurate bombardment by 2,000 guns along a 200 mile front, the opening attack was highly successful. Brusilov avoided expensive narrow human-wave attacks by using specialized units to attack weak points in the Austro-Hungarian lines, thereby opening gaps through which larger forces could break through in strength, including cavalry units. The town of Lutsk was taken in a matter of days, despite a disadvantage in numbers, and by the end of the month the Austro-Hungarian forces were in full retreat. The Russiansxwere held up for a few days south of Kovel, and in early July they took several days to overcome the gallant defence put up by the Polish Legion at the Battle of Kostiuchnowka, but by late August Brusilov’s four armies had advanced on a wide front, the Carpathian Mountains had been reached, and most of Galicia was in Russian hands. By then some 350,000 prisoners had been taken, together with a horde of guns, and many Slave units – bearing no allegiance to their Habsburg rulers – had deserted en masse.
As a result, the state of Austria-Hungary itself was close to collapse, and the Emperor had to beg for German assistance (at the very hour of a new British offensive on the Somme!), and, at the same time, bring back guns and troops from the Italian front. If, at this point, the Russian commanders to the north of the Brusilov offensive had launched a concerted attack, the Empire might possibly have fallen, but their delay gave the Germans time to divert troops from the Western Front (eventually amounting to 24 divisions!) to confront the Russians and check their advance. Without additional support, by the 20th September the highly successful Brusilov offensive had ground to a halt, lacking the supplies necessary to advance further. It had achieved its aim in drawing troops from the Western and Italian fronts (clearly assisting the Allies in both regions), but it had paid a heavy price in so doing. In the event, the loss of close on a million men, and the humiliating withdrawal from land so painfully won (300 miles wide and 60 miles deep), had a disastrous effect upon the morale of Russian troops, and added substantially to the political and social unrest already at large throughout Russia. Thus, ironically, the Brusilov Offensive – Russia’s outstanding feat of arms during the First World War; an action which secured more enemy territory than any other Allied offensive; and is seen by some as the Entente’s greatest victory – contributed in no small measure to Russia’s collapse in 1917!
Incidentally, the early success of the Brusilov Offensive led to a complete overhaul of the Central Powers’ command structure, foreshadowed, as noted earlier, by the failure of the Trentino Offensive. As a result, by the end of September, the Austro-Hungarian ground forces had been virtually taken over by the German high command. For the remainder of the war they increasingly came to rely on the leadership and support of the Germans on and off the battlefield.
ThexRussian general Aleksei Brusilov (1853-1926) was born into a noble family. He 
began his army career as a cavalry officer in the Caucasus and distinguished himself in the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78. When the First World War broke out he played a conspicuous part in the Russian campaign in Galicia in 1914, and it was there, two years later, that he planned and led the successful Brusilov Offensive. As a commander he was a great innovator, and became known for his introduction of new tactics, some of which were later employed by the Germans on the Western Front. He was concerned about the welfare of the men under his command, and it was he, as we have seen, who wrote to the Tsar complaining about the lack of basic equipment, including rifles, and the need for better basic training. The army, he wrote, “was drowning in its own blood”. In May 1917 he was appointed Commander in Chief of the Russian Army, but was replaced in July following the failure of the Kerensky Offensive. Under the Bolshevik government he served as Inspector of Cavalry, but he retired in 1924.
It was in the midst of the Brusilov Offensive (27th August), that Romania, inspired by the Russian advance, declared war on the Central Powers and seized a long awaited opportunity to capture Transylvania, ethnically regarded as her own, but then part of Hungary. The Allied Powers encouraged and welcomed the move, hoping it would be the final nail in the Austro-Hungarian coffin, but, as we shall see, that was not to be. Once again the Bulgarians added their weight to the Central Powers, and the Romanian forces, despite Russian assistance, suffered serious setbacks. By the end of 1916 only Western Modavia remained under Romanian control, and the future looked bleak.
